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While the population at large has suffered the economic dislocation of the transition 
period without a social safety net, members of parliament cling to a fairly extensive 
system of state-sponsored benefits. Judging by the Duma elections of 1993 and 1995, 
when only one-third of the delegates was replaced, the composition of the new lower 
house of parliament, to be elected on 19 December, may not be altered substantially 
from the present one. If so, one should expect neither legislative breakthrough nor a 
change in the representatives' approach to the issue of their privileges, benefits, and 
immunities. 
On the eve of the election campaign, the Russian legislators finally defined the extent of 
their immunities and compensation. For several years, negative public opinion and the 
president's repeated rejection prevented the deputies from passing a law on this matter. 
As late as March 1999, Boris Yel'tsin had once again vetoed such a document. 
However, a couple of months later he signed it into law, and the bill, "Concerning the 
status of a deputy ...," came into effect on 8 July. 
The Duma deputies' struggle for this law was long and persistent, and the opposition 
from the Russian public and the press still has not slackened. So what lies at the root of 
the discord?
Several of the law's articles bolster negative elements of the existing system. For 
example, according to the document, a deputy of the State Duma "is granted a monthly 
monetary remuneration equivalent to the monthly remuneration of a federal minister," 
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while the speaker of the lower house receives a salary equal to the prime minister's. 
Currently, a minister earns 6,000 rubles (roughly $240), and the premier about 8,000 
rubles (roughly $320). The deputies of the State Duma had received salaries at the 
ministerial level in the past. In that regard, nothing has changed.
However, congratulations are due to regional governors and chairmen of regional 
parliaments who constitute the membership of the Federation Council, the upper house 
of the Federal Assembly. Prior to this legislation, they received payment only from their 
regions. Now the salary of the Federation Council chairman will be equal to 80 percent 
of the prime minister's salary, that of his deputy will be 60 percent of the first deputy 
prime minister's, and a committee chairman of the upper house will receive 50 percent 
of a federal minister's salary. [By way of comparison, the official monthly salary of the 
president of Russia is 10,000 rubles (about $400).] All members of the Upper House are 
compensated for their hotel expenses and granted a per diem for time spent away from 
home while carrying out their duties. Of course, as governors and regional chairmen 
they still receive remuneration from their home regions, where all too frequently they 
simply determine their own salaries.
In addition to a ministerial salary, the law provides payment for supplementary expenses 
connected to the deputies' duties. Such expenses can reach about 500 rubles per 
month ($20). This amount does not include the deputies' office expenses and staff 
salaries, which are provided for in the Duma budget. The deputy may hire up to five 
persons on staff, but the total amount he may pay out in salary cannot exceed one 
deputy's salary. In addition, the parliament receives "material aid," the magnitude of 
which is determined by how much the State Duma has at its disposal. In sum, the 
official monthly salary of a deputy to either House does not exceed $500.
Is that too much or too little? To a Western reader it represents a very modest sum. It 
seems that, even including all of the bonuses, a Russian deputy receives a laughable 
salary, equivalent to that of a very poor US citizen. In fact, the higher level of 
remuneration in the West became an argument for approving the law concerning the 
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Russian deputies' privileges. Many deputies argued that to stay abreast of other 
nations, they must attract highly competent individuals to the legislature through higher 
levels of compensation.
When the law concerning privileges was debated in the State Duma, a Communist 
Party deputy, Yuri Ivanov, claimed "Even in Ecuador, a parliament member receives 
about $6,000 -- and that's a third world country." One could accept such arguments if it 
wasn't for the catastrophic polarization of wealth in present-day Russia. While the 
average monthly income in Moscow is $300-500, in most of the rest of Russia it is 
$40-50.
However, the tenfold gulf between a deputy's pay and the average national income 
alone does not inspire public criticism. Rather, resentment stems from this vast 
difference plus the fact that parliamentarians get their salary on time while, on average, 
wages and pensions are paid two to three months late. The public also is disturbed by 
the numerous privileges deputies claim, to "compensate" for their low -- by Western 
standards -- salary.
FREE APARTMENT, CAR, ETC. ...
Numerous privileges create hidden sources of income. For example, the state budget 
pays for the deputies' healthcare, sanitarium holidays, and household expenses. The 
representative pays nothing out of his own pocket. Moreover, deputies receive 48 days 
paid vacation each year.
The new law provides for an entire system of social guarantees in case of various 
political crises and cataclysms. For example, if the president dismisses the State Duma, 
the deputies would receive three months salary immediately. Still, this is not the most 
cherished reward. 
3
Perhaps the right to free accommodations in the capital represents the most valuable 
part of the deputies' compensation. Strangely, it is here that an improvement in the law 
must be noted. The article which stated that "at the request of the deputy, he may 
receive a one-time compensation for the purchase of his living quarters" has been 
removed. This means that deputies will no longer be allowed to buy Moscow 
apartments at the taxpayers' expense.
The history of the deputies' "living situations" represents an interesting case study. The 
representatives chosen in 1989 to the Congress of the People's Deputies of the USSR 
were allowed to live in state-owned apartments in Moscow's best neighborhoods, which 
were reserved for the political elite. Later many of them privatized these apartments. 
Not one of these politicians paid the market price of real estate in Moscow (averaging 
$700 per sq. meter), and many received the apartments gratis. According to long-
standing practice, those elected from the provinces retained their Moscow apartments 
after their terms expired. Their replacements would receive new apartments. The 
deputies of the current Duma wanted to be compensated for the purchase of 
apartments to the tune of $50,000-60,000 for each representative. In the Moscow 
mayor's office, many joked that soon the city would consist entirely of parliamentarians. 
Now that particular avenue of obtaining real estate on the cheap is closed. According to 
the new law, the budget will compensate the deputy for rent on a furnished apartment, 
with a telephone, in a parliamentary building or another type of building designated for 
official uses, or in a private hotel. The deputy must vacate the apartment no later than a 
month after the end of his term. The deputy retains the right to purchase a Moscow 
apartment, but he must use his own resources to do so. The new provisions seem 
reasonable. In the absence of some state-sponsored Moscow accommodations for the 
provincial deputies, Muscovites, who are already over-represented in the Duma, would 
dominate it entirely. The trouble with the previous arrangement was not the housing of 
deputies in Moscow, but rather their tendency to turn state-issued apartments into 
private property.
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Parliament members may make telephone calls at no charge to all cities in Russia, as 
well as all over the world. If he decides that his presence is needed at a remote location, 
a deputy travels to any point in Russia, or abroad, at the expense of the State Duma 
budget. Naturally, the MPs of both houses retain the right to free use of all forms of 
transportation except taxis. The last condition should not pose too much of a problem 
since each of the 450 deputies can order an official car. Such vehicles are distributed in 
the following manner: Chamber leaders receive Mercedes-600, faction leaders receive 
Audi-8A, and the remaining deputies get a Russian GAZ-2131 or "Volga." These cars 
come with state plates authorizing right of way for the driver. These plates also apply to 
the deputy's own car.
The government, that is the taxpayer, carries the burden of the deputies' all-
encompassing welfare system. If one were to compile in detail all the indirect expenses 
for one deputy, the result would be on the order of $9,000 per month per average 
deputy. This applies only to the deputies of the State Duma. We do not have the figures 
for the indirect expenses of the 178 members of the Federation Council. The generous 
$9,000 figure, not the modest $500, therefore, should be compared to the compensation 
levels in other countries. 
IMMUNITY ÜBER ALLES
The law concerning the deputies' compensation includes freedom from prosecution. 
Article 19 provides "immunity for the duration of his duties" to each member of the 
Federation Council and State Duma. Without the consent of the majority of the 
corresponding chamber of parliament, no deputy may face criminal or administrative 
responsibility, detention, arrest, search, or questioning, unless he is caught red-handed 
at the crime scene. The deputy cannot be subject to personal surveillance, except in 
cases where sanctioned by federal law to ensure the safety of other citizens. Whether in 
practice this deters the security agencies is another matter entirely.
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This is not all. Immunity applies to living space, office space, transportation, means of 
communication, and luggage. For example, a member of the security organs may not 
search a deputy's briefcase without his permission. Outside of Russian borders, a 
diplomatic passport valid for the duration of the term saves the MPs from excessive 
troubles. Unlike the practice in some countries, his colleagues, not a court or a judge, 
decide whether a deputy's immunity can be waived to pursue criminal or administrative 
charges.
The Federation Council and the State Duma inherited the institution of immunity from 
the old Soviet system. Whereas under the communist, totalitarian regime, a man with a 
criminal past or criminal connections would not find his way into the legislative organs -- 
for this he would need the approval of the KGB, which also monitored the deputies' 
loyalty to the CPSU -- now the democratic process and diplomatic immunity represent a 
formidable limitation on the work of the law enforcement bodies. In 1993, immediately 
after the first democratic elections for the State Duma, the national security and judicial 
system faced the problem: how to bring charges against deputies. In a true showing of 
corporate solidarity, parliament members withheld their consent to the investigation and 
trial of other deputies, even of political opponents. The State Duma has adhered to its 
stand of "we won't give up our own men," even in infamous, truly embarrassing cases.
Repeatedly the general procurator's office attempted to solicit the permission of the 
State Duma to bring to justice the man who started the financial pyramid "MMM," Sergei 
Mavrodi. The scheme, which swindled millions of dollars from naïve investors, was 
exposed in 1994. Mavrodi ran for and won a Duma seat in the 1995 elections. It was 
known at the time that he procured a mandate specifically to avoid jail. And, indeed, 
parliamentary immunity was invoked to extend to criminal acts committed before the 
beginning of the deputy's term. Only on the third attempt, on October 6, 1995, did the 
State Duma vote to lift Mavrodi's immunity.
The Duma is not above using administrative means to stall the investigations of its 
members. When a request from the procurator or the court concerning bringing a 
6
deputy to trial is received, the Duma does not rush to discuss the question. The lower 
chamber will take up the question of lifting immunity a week after it is introduced into the 
agenda. That leaves the representative plenty of time to leave town. This is exactly what 
happened in the spring of 1998. While the State Duma debated the issue of whether to 
deprive Nadirshakh Khachilaev of parliamentary immunity, he disappeared somewhere 
in the mountains of Chechnya, far out of federal control. Khachilaev was accused of 
staging a coup attempt against the regional government of Dagestan in 1998 and is one 
of the main leaders of the Wahhabi villages now under siege.
Clearly the institution of parliamentary immunity is open to many forms of abuse. One 
other practice should be noted in this regard. Immunity extends to civil cases, which 
means it can be applied in matters completely unrelated to legislative activity. For 
instance, if a deputy's former wife seeks alimony or child support, the deputy and his 
property are immune from prosecution. The former wife has virtually no judicial 
recourse.
A new election campaign began on 10 August. The government says that everything 
possible was done to prevent criminal elements from getting into the State Duma. For 
example, every candidate's criminal record has been checked, and law enforcement 
organs will examine their biographies. These measures may weed out some criminals 
and they may also be abused for political motives; however, as long as deputies have 
immunity for the entire duration of their terms, the State Duma remains very enticing to 
the criminal world.
ENTER THE EXECUTIVE
A few years ago the deputies' inordinate privileges and immunities roused the ire not 
only of the Russian public. Boris Yel'tsin and other government figures were considered 
among the main opponents of such hidden benefits. However, in politics there are no 
fixed positions. With time, Boris Yel'tsin spoke more and more rarely about the need to 
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reform these practices, while the deputies ratified more and more bills to increase their 
material capabilities. 
The ratification of the law concerning deputies' privileges definitively ends the struggle 
over this issue. The cease-fire between the branches has two main causes. First of all, 
members of the Federation Council are as interested in obtaining "compensation" as 
their colleagues in the Duma. For this reason, Russian senators stubbornly opposed 
ratifying the original version of the law, which leaned in the direction of giving greater 
privileges to the Duma members. However, they agreed readily to the present version, 
which, as pointed out, increased their salaries and provided many other benefits on a 
par with the Duma. Whereas Yel'tsin could fend off the demands of the Duma with the 
support of the Federation Council, he did not risk opposing the united front of both 
houses.
Second, the president turned a blind eye to the parliamentarians' greedy behavior 
because the Directorate of Presidential Affairs under Pavel Borodin administers and 
implements these perks and privileges. In this way, the presidential administration 
apportions cars and apartments to the deputies. This makes for a bizarre arrangement: 
The deputies depend on the president to hand out the goodies. Clearly the Kremlin can 
use these "material incentives" to bring opposition deputies in line with its program. The 
significance of these incentives becomes clear from the statement of the presidential 
representative to the Duma, Aleksandr Kotenkov, who said, "the adoption of the law on 
benefits resulted from a certain political compromise, achieved on the eve of the 
elections, when the president was willing to make certain political concessions in order 
to avoid raising tensions in the country."
The law on the deputies privileges won the support of the entire spectrum of political 
parties in the Duma; the left, the right, the democrats, and the communists voted for this 
measure. The 46 deputies of Grigory Yavlinsky's YABLOKO faction opposed the bill 
entirely on their own. The bill passed with 298 votes, where only 226 are required.
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HOW MUCH LEGISLATIVE WORK DOES THAT BUY?
Officially, of course, the question of the deputies' privileges and benefits does not bear 
upon the body's legislative responsibilities. Yet it seems fair to ask: Have the deputies 
earned the rather high level of compensation they receive? Do they pass the laws 
necessary for society to function smoothly?
It has been observed frequently that desperately needed legislation languishes in the 
Duma. During the Spring 1999 session the deputies had planned to adopt 540 pieces of 
legislation. However, during the course of the season's 50 plenary meetings, only 194 
laws were passed. At first glance this is an impressive figure, but upon further 
examination it becomes clear that the Duma avoids the really important and 
complicated legislation. Not one piece of the basic or system-building legislation was 
passed during the entire season. As a result, crucial matters remain unresolved. The 
land bill, which involves the question of private ownership of land, a very sensitive issue 
for the Russians, floats in limbo. The Duma postponed work on several vital legislative 
issues: the criminal code; a new labor code; the second part of the tax code; the draft 
laws "On attorneys," "On guaranteeing bank deposits," "On countering political 
extremism," and many others. 
The main cause of the legislative inaction resides in the deputies' political ambitions as 
evidenced by their tendency to give disproportionate attention to the very visible, highly 
politicized questions. The attempt to impeach the president constitutes the most obvious 
example of this. Anyone can get excited about removing the president, but who besides 
lawyers cares about the draft law, "On attorneys"? Thus, the Duma bumped vital 
legislation only to spend eight precious months trying to launch impeachment 
proceedings, which failed miserably in the end.
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The complex organizational and procedural rules of the Duma pose even greater 
obstacles. The Duma contains 28 committees which have substantial, but not decisive, 
authority over the drafts in their care. A draft must go into committee before debate at a 
plenary session. If the committee endorses the draft it is brought up for a vote at the 
plenary session. If the committee rejects the draft, it is not presented to the full body. So 
far, so good. The complication arises from the fact that the author of the legislation may 
present it to the plenary session without the consent of the committee. Not only is it 
possible to have a situation where the Duma adopts a bill that has been rejected by the 
relevant committee, by the presidential administration, and by the government, but this 
happens with some frequency. The obverse also holds: Bills that sailed through the 
deliberative process, and have the support of the administration, can be and are 
defeated on the Duma floor. This majority rule approach contrasts sharply with the 
practice of most Western states where the committee which examines the matter in 
detail and summons expert opinion has decisive power over whether the bill is 
discussed by the full body.
Founded in December 1993, the Duma is a very young institution, with only a short 
history. The upcoming elections will mark only its third term. It seems unlikely at this 
point that the composition and membership of the next Duma will represent something 
qualitatively different from the present one. Still, as a new body the Duma has the 
potential to alter its procedures and perhaps even reevaluate its values and priorities. 
There has not been enough time for the ineffective and greedy practices to become fully  
entrenched. Perhaps the day is not too far off when legislative work rather than the 
quest for privileges and immunities becomes the focus of the Duma's deliberations.
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